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PROTECTING VICTIMS BY WORKING
AROUND THE SYSTEM AND WITHIN THE SYSTEM:
STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR EMOTIONAL ABUSE
IN THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence perpetrated against a woman or man is often part of
a systematic pattern of dominance and control.' The intimate relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim accommodates the "continual vic-
timization" characteristic of domestic violence, which may include stalking,
harassment, intimidation, nonphysical offenses, and less serious crimes.2
While victims whose partners are emotionally or verbally abusive, jealous,
or controlling are significantly more likely to report being raped and/or
physically assaulted by their partners, 3 domestic violence can also be
inflicted through purely psychological methods.4
In the United States during the past fifty years, there have been
substantial transformations regarding both the quantity and types of legal
actions available to domestic violence victims, and society's level of aware-
ness and acceptance for such behavior. 5 However, there is little consensus
on how to define domestic violence, which acts the offense includes, and
what the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim must be. 6 This
note examines the legal realities and substance of state statutes that either
1. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NAT'L VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iv (July 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/
nij/181867.pdf.
2. WAYNE STENEHJEM, OFF. OF ATT'Y GEN., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NORTH DAKOTA 1
(2001), available at http://www.ag.state.nd.us/Reports/BCIReports/ Domvio2001 .pdf.
3. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at iv.
4. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing
that domestic violence can be purely psychological and committed in the form of forced social and
economic isolation, verbal harassment, threats of future violence, or destruction of personal
property).
5. See Sharon M. Grosfeld, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence, M.D. B.J. May-June
2005, at 25, 26 (tracing women's legal identities from the Married Women's Property Act of 1882
to modem statutes and the 1994 Violence Against Women Act); Arthur L. Rizer III, Mandatory
Arrest: Do We Need to Take a Closer Look?, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 3-10 (2005) (summarizing the
history of domestic violence in society, from biblical text to modem day mandatory arrest
statutes).
6. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 5.
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include or exclude emotional abuse7 in the definition of domestic violence. 8
Part II provides an analysis of statutory definitions of domestic violence.
Additionally, the effects of the two predominant categories of domestic
abuse statutes, those broadly defined and those narrowly defined, will be
explored. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the common law tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress will be examined as an alternative for
victims who are not provided statutory protection against emotional abuse.
Part III concentrates on the lack of statutory protection for victims of
emotional abuse in North Dakota. In conclusion, Part IV proposes amend-
ments to the current North Dakota statute and provides model statutory
language for redefining the offense of domestic violence in the state.
II. STATE RECOGNITION OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE
Domestic violence is defined differently among states' civil and
criminal codes.9 Some states define the offense broadly, providing specific
7. The term "emotional abuse" will be used throughout this article in reference to any type of
psychological violence or abuse. Individual state statutes and judicial decisions may recognize the
offense in any of the following ways: "emotional/mental abuse," "emotional/mental violence,"
"emotional/mental harm," or "psychological abuse." See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 459-
a(1)(i) (McKinney 2005) (using the terminology of "emotional injury" and "emotional harm" in
defining domestic violence); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(l)(a), (8) (2005) (including "mental
harm" as a type of abuse); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-202 (West 2005) (recognizing the creation
of fear of physical harm by psychological abuse as a type of domestic violence).
8. The term "domestic violence" will be used interchangeably with "domestic abuse"
throughout this article. Some statutes identify the offense as "family violence." See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-13-10(5) (2005) (defining "family violence" as "the commission of the offenses
of battery... assault, stalking, criminal damage to property, or criminal trespass between family
or household members"). Additionally, some states define "domestic violence," as well as
subsections of the offense like "intimate partner battering" or general "abuse." See, e.g., CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1107 (West 2005) (providing that expert testimony is admissible in a criminal
action to establish the effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the victim); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6203 (West 2005) (defining "abuse" as causing or attempting to cause bodily injury,
sexual assault, or placing another in reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily injury). Many
government reports identify the offense as "intimate partner violence." E.g., CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 1 (2003),
available at http://www.ojp. usdoj.gov /bjs/abstract/ipvl0.htm (recognizing intimate partner
violence as "nonfatal violent victimizations committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends,
or girlfriends..."). Moreover, the federal government has defined "domestic violence" to include
"felony or misdemeanor crimes of violence.., under the domestic or family violence laws of the
jurisdiction receiving grant monies .... " 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg-2(l) (2000).
9. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-918, 39-6303 (2005) (providing protection against
domestic violence in the state's criminal and civil codes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2005)
(providing that a petition for a domestic abuse protection order is a civil action in which the
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a household member inflicted
domestic violence); see also Pamela Saperstein, Note, Teen Dating Violence: Eliminating
Statutory Barriers to Civil Protection Orders, 39 FAM. L.Q. 181, 190 (2005) (discussing the
different ways states define domestic violence).
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statutory protection against emotional abuse.10 Other statutes attempt to
cover emotional abuse through provisions protecting against harassment"
or stalking.12 Still other statutes are drafted narrowly and are significantly
10. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1 (LexisNexis 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
400.1501(d) (West 2005); Act of Apr. 7, 2005, ch. 187, sec. 39-51-2111, § 5(a), 2005 Mont. Laws
ch. 187 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-2111); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(C)(2)
(LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 481-c(1), 459-a(1)(i); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 50B-
1(a) (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(1)(a), (8); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-202.
The statutes listed above represent most, if not all, of the states that specifically provide protection
for emotional abuse. Statutes of this type cover the three general types of domestic violence:
emotional, physical, and sexual abuse. Saperstein, supra note 9, at 190 n.48.
11. Harassment is often defined similarly to the language provided by the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(7) (West 2005).
"Harassment" means knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose
that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional
distress; and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner. Unless the presumption is
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the following types of conduct shall be
presumed to cause emotional distress:
(i) creating a disturbance at petitioner's place of employment or school;
(ii) repeatedly telephoning petitioner's place of employment, home or residence;
(iii) repeatedly following petitioner about in a public place or places;
(iv) repeatedly keeping petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside his
or her home, school, place of employment, vehicle or other place occupied by
petitioner or by peering in petitioner's windows;
(v)...; or
(vi) threatening physical force, confinement or restraint on one or more occasions.
Id.
12. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(1)(k) (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2004); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2005); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211, 6320 (West 2005); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-800.3, 18-9-111 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28(2) (West 2005);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19-
A, § 4002(1) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(b) (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
518B.01(a), 609.749 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(1) (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 33.018(c)(1) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(I) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-19(a) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(1) (West 2005); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6102 (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (2005) (amended by 2006
S.D. LAWS ch. 120 (H.B. 1064)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1(2)(d), (i) (2005); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West 2005). The statutes listed above represent most, if not all, of the
states that provide protection for emotional abuse in the definition of domestic violence through
the use of harassment and/or stalking laws. Stalking may be defined similarly to that of
Missouri's Adult Abuse statute:
[Wlhen an adult purposely and repeatedly engages in an unwanted course of conduct
that causes alarm to another person when it is reasonable in that person's situation to
have been alarmed by the conduct.
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of repeated acts over a
period of time, however short, that serves no legitimate purpose. Such conduct may
include, but is not limited to, following the other person or unwanted communication
or unwanted contact;
(b) "Repeated" means two or more incidents evidencing a continuity of purpose; and
(c) "Alarm" means to cause fear of danger of physical harm.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(10); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000) (providing federal criminal
sanctions for interstate domestic violence and stalking). Interestingly, a state might not provide
protection from stalking or harassment in the domestic violence statute; however, protection may
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more restrictive regarding what constitutes domestic violence.' 3 Such stat-
utes may provide protection against "the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, [or] sexual activity" but not against emotional
harm independent of such physical abuse or habitual conduct.' 4 Regardless
of the breadth of a state's statutory protection, legislatures intend such
domestic violence laws "to fill the void in existing laws in order to protect
victims ... from further harm."15
A. STATUTORY INCLUSION OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE
1. Addressing Emotional Abuse
States that provide statutory protection against emotional abuse
effectively recognize that many people in violent relationships are victims
of "systematic terrorism." 16 That is to say, many victims experience
"multiple forms of abuse and control at the hands of their partners," not just
physical violence.17 Common nonphysical abuses include: controlling the
victim's access to finances, isolating the victim from family and friends,
damaging or destroying the victim's personal property, physically hitting or
be extended to potential victims in the specific "stalking" or "harassment" laws of the state. E.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b) (2003) (providing criminal sanctions for stalking a spouse,
parent, child, sibling, or housemate).
13. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-103(2) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(a)
(West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 703A(a) (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-918, 39-6303;
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-42 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(2) (West 2005); KAN.
CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3412a (West 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720(1) (West 2005); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:362(3) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 2005); MIsS.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-3(a) (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903(1) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-07.1-01(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 644(c) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705
(1)(a)-(c) (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601(1), 39-13-111(b) (West 2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021,
71.004 (Vernon 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1101 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (West
2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(1)(a) (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(iii)
(2004). The statutes listed above represent most, if not all, of the states that do not provide
protection for emotional abuse in the domestic violence context.
14. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (providing protection against only actual
physical harm or the imminent fear of physical harm). "The use of the phrase 'infliction of fear'
in the statute implies that the legislature intended that there be some overt action to indicate that
[the perpetrator] intended to put [the victim] in fear of imminent physical harm." Kass v. Kass,
355 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis in original).
15. Gaab v. Ochsner, 2001 ND 195, J 5, 636 N.W.2d 669, 671; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.2901(2) (stating that it is the legislature's intent that "domestic violence be treated as a
criminal act rather than a private matter"; therefore, criminal prosecution is the favored method of
enforcing compliance of protective orders); Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 164 (N.D. 1995)
(articulating that domestic violence statutes are "intended to counteract the myths that: domestic
violence is not a serious crime; victims provoke or deserve the violence; victims habitually lie or
exaggerate the extent of violence; and domestic violence is a private family matter").
16. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 56.
17. Id.
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throwing objects at a surface nearby the victim, or conducting surveillance
of the victim. 18 To adequately address the reality that such activities com-
monly occur within abusive relationships, lawmakers may draft a domestic
violence statute broadly, such as the following:
"[D]omestic abuse" means any incident by a household member
against another household member resulting in: (1) physical harm;
(2) severe emotional distress; (3) bodily injury or assault; (4) a
threat causing imminent fear of bodily injury by any household
member; (5) criminal trespass; (6) criminal damage to property;
(7) repeatedly driving by a residence or work place; (8) telephone
harassment; (9) stalking; (10) harassment; or (11) harm or
threatened harm to children .... 19
This statute effectively enumerates certain acts that could be treated as
domestic abuse. 20 Additionally, the logistical effect of such a statute is that
a victim is not required to seek legal protection under a variety of laws, but
may succinctly petition for judicial intervention by necessarily satisfying
only one or two provisions. 21
18. Interview with Debbie Kleven, Dist. Judge, Grand Forks Dist. Court, in Grand Forks,
N.D. (Oct. 4, 2005) (on file with N.D. Law Review).
19. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (LexisNexis 2005). Where a state's definition of "domestic
violence" is not expansive, an additional statute defining who constitutes a victim of domestic
violence may have the same effect. For example:
"Victim of domestic violence" means any person over the age of sixteen, any married
person or any parent accompanied by his or her minor child or children in situations in
which such person or such person's child is a victim of an act which would constitute
a violation of the penal law, including, but not limited to acts constituting disorderly
conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, assault, attempt-
ed assault, or attempted murder; and
(i) such act or acts have resulted in actual physical or emotional injury or have
created a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm to such person or such
person's child; and
(ii) such act or acts are or are alleged to have been committed by a family or
household member.
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 459-a (McKinney 2005).
20. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (enumerating eleven offenses that are punishable as
domestic violence in New Mexico).
21. See id. (providing domestic violence victims with broad statutory protection against
emotional abuse). Often, petitioners for a domestic violence protection order get the "run around"
when dealing with community organizations, the police department, and the judiciary because one
organization informs them of certain options and then another directs them differently. Interview
with Joel Medd, Dist. Judge, Grand Forks Dist. Court, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 4, 2005) (on file
with N.D. Law Review). Judge Joel Medd has concluded that it would be useful to have all
available statutory protections for emotional abuse stated in one place. Id. However, not all
judges think such consolidations are necessary, and some observe that domestic violence victims
generally receive relief, even if it is through an action in tort or an amended order for a disorderly
conduct restraining order, instead of a domestic violence protection order. Interview with Sonja
Clapp, Dist. Judge, Grand Forks Dist. Court, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 3, 2005) (on file with
N.D. Law Review).
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2. Defining Emotional Abuse
When a state includes emotional abuse in its domestic violence statute,
difficulties arise in whether to define it, and if so, how to define it.22 Most
states have not defined emotional abuse in their adult abuse statutes.2 3
Additionally, when a court is presented with an opportunity to define such
abuse, it likely will not do so. 24 Rather, the court may find that enough
evidence exists "if there is more than a scintilla of evidence" that emotional
abuse has occurred or will occur. 25 Alternatively, a court may rely on its
experience and subjective discretion and invoke some sort of threshold in
order to weed out false claims. 26 The court may also rely on a definition of
emotional abuse provided by an expert in the field of domestic violence.27
However, expert testimony is not normally provided because most
petitioners come before the court pro se; therefore, the only testimony
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965) (providing that mental
suffering "includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea"). Judge Debbie
Kleven suggests that emotional abuse should not be defined as "psychological harm or abuse"
because then a victim might be required to present expert testimony, which would make it more
difficult for a victim to satisfy her or his burden of proof. Interview with Judge Debbie Kleven,
supra note 18.
23. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102 (2005) (defining "psychological abuse" in a
child abuse statute). A definition of emotional abuse is more likely to be found in a state's child
abuse statute. Id. For example, in Montana, "'[p]sychological abuse or neglect' means severe
maltreatment through acts or omissions that are injurious to the child's emotional, intellectual, or
psychological capacity to function, including the commission of acts of violence against another
person residing in the child's home." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, a state may define
emotional abuse under a separate statute as, "the infliction of or allowing another person to cause
serious emotional damage as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or aggressive
behavior and which emotional damage is diagnosed by a medical doctor or psychologist." In re
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S 113432, 872 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994) (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(1) (2003)).
24. See In re N.H., 155 S.W.3d 820, 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to define
"emotional abuse" where the statute and state supreme court had been silent); In re Jane Doe 10,
78 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. 2002) (recognizing that neither the statute nor the court had yet defined
"emotional abuse," and again declining to define it).
25. In re Jane Doe, 78 S.W.3d at 342.
26. See In re Taylor, 731 A.2d 35, 43 (N.J. 1999) (concluding that "sufficient credible
evidence" existed to support the findings of fact that abuse did not exist); In re N.H., 155 S.W.3d
at 823 (recognizing a threshold of "competent and substantial evidence" that abuse existed). The
courts must require petitioners to prove a certain degree of emotional abuse, because otherwise the
judiciary would become involved in any civil or domestic dispute. Interview with Judge Joel
Medd, supra note 21.
27. Dean v. Dean, 579 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1991). In Dean, an expert testified
that mental abuse could be defined as "a form of domestic violence in that it is a method of
controlling the actions and thoughts of one person for the purpose of controlling the
[relationship]." Id.
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presented is usually that of the lay petitioner and respondent. 28 Funda-
mentally, one of the most challenging aspects of legal protection against
emotional violence is the simple difficulty of defining the abuse. 29
3. Use of Subjectivity in Detecting Emotional Abuse
Regardless of the form of abuse, whether domestic violence exists in
any particular civil dispute is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier
of fact. 30 In most jurisdictions, the judge must utilize substantial subjective
discretion in weighing the effects of the abuse in light of all other circum-
stances. 31 In reaching a conclusion, this subjective understanding may be
exemplified as simply a knowledge that severe emotional abuse exists, ver-
sus a jaded "victim" going through a divorce or bad times who is attempting
to misuse the judicial system. 32 Ultimately, upon finding that actual or im-
minent domestic violence has occurred, a trial court may grant a protection
order providing injunctive relief to the victim. 33 Unfortunately, however,
many victims still do not report incidents of domestic abuse to the police,
nor do most seek protection orders. 34
28. See Morton County Soc. Serv. Bd. v. Schumacher, 2004 ND 31, T 25, 674 N.W.2d 505,
509 (finding that the district court is in the best position to evaluate testimony because "it observes
the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses").
29. See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting that when organizations or state
legislatures limit the definition of intimate partner violence to "acts carried out with the intention
of, or perceived intention of, causing physical pain or injury to another person," that the "myriad
behaviors that persons may use to control, intimidate, and otherwise dominate another person" are
ignored).
30. Lovcik v. Ellingson, 1997 ND 201, T 10, 569 N.W.2d 697, 699.
31. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 16 P.3d 74, 80-82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (examining four
circumstances in determining the defendant's sentence, including the period of time over which
the abuse occurred, whether the offenses were committed almost immediately after the defendant
was served with a restraining order, the age and vulnerability of the victim, and whether the defen-
dant acted with deliberate cruelty in repeatedly threatening to kill the victim and her family). In
North Dakota, Judge Debbie Kleven has almost always recognized emotional abuse and will grant
domestic violence protection orders without the existence of physical abuse when the victim is
honestly fearful for her or his safety or health. Interview with Judge Debbie Kleven, supra note
18. Moreover, through use of such subjective discretion, a judge is able to "tell when someone is
frayed" and rule accordingly. Id.
32. See Interview with Judge Debbie Kleven, supra note 18 (explaining that some judges are
able to work around the current legislation in North Dakota, and are very willing to do so when
the victim's emotional abuse is real and extreme).
33. Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2004 ND 153, T 11, 684 N.W.2d 619, 626-27. See also N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2005) (providing the process for obtaining a domestic violence
protection order).
34. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at v. In fact, "most victims of intimate partner
violence do not consider the justice system an appropriate vehicle for resolving conflicts with
intimates." Id.
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B. STATUTORY EXCLUSION OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE
Overall, the law has developed slowly in affording independent pro-
tection to the interest of freedom from emotional abuse, primarily because
of the "fear of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and
the difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries." 35 Consequently,
states that do not provide statutory protection for emotional abuse have
established the threshold of judicial protection at physical abuse or the
imminent threat thereof.36 A typical statute that excludes emotional abuse
may define "domestic violence" as the following:
[T]he occurrence of one or more of the following acts between
family or household members: a) Attempting to cause or inten-
tionally and knowingly causing bodily injury with or without a
dangerous instrument; b) Placing, by physical menace, another
person in fear of imminent bodily injury; or c) Engaging in sexual
contact or sexual penetration without consent .... 37
Other than the fear specifically defined in such statutes, mental harm is not
within the statutory definition of domestic violence, and therefore it will not
be a definitive part of a court's analysis in determining the presence of do-
mestic violence in a particular relationship. 38
1. Use of Circumstantial Evidence in Identifying Domestic
Violence
Courts will weigh the degree and effect of abuses enumerated in the
statute, as well as some circumstances that may not be listed.39 For exam-
ple, a court may consider credible evidence of any incident of domestic
violence that resulted in serious bodily injury, any incident that involved the
use of a dangerous weapon, or whether a pattern of abuse existed within a
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b (1965).
36. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2003) (setting the threshold for abuse prevention at
acts that intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury or the fear of imminent bodily
injury to another person); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2004) (setting the threshold for domestic
abuse prevention at offenses that attempt to cause or do cause physical harm, or place another "in
fear of imminent serious physical harm").
37. S. 633, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2005)
(setting forth the basis for the current, slightly amended, bill).
38. DesLauriers v. DesLauriers, 2002 ND 66, 5 17, 642 N.W.2d 892, 897.
39. See Gaab v. Ochsner, 2001 ND 195, 7, 636 N.W.2d 669, 672 (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in extending a domestic violence protection order where the ex-
tension was based on evidence of the perpetrator's violation of the order, the victim remained
fearful of the perpetrator due to continuing acts of domestic violence, and the original protection
order was issued less than one year prior to the petition to extend the order).
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reasonable time proximate to the proceedings.no However, courts have sub-
stantial discretion in determining whether domestic violence has occurred,
and consequently, a court might be unwilling to find that abuse has oc-
curred in circumstances other than those put forth in the statute. 41 For
example, when the perpetrator's conduct involves destruction of property, a
court is unlikely to consider such destructive conduct as an act of domestic
violence when the statute is silent in regard to such conduct.42 To ensure
that judges must consider certain types of conduct in finding domestic
violence, lawmakers should be clear and concise regarding what constitutes
the abuse. 43
2. Legislative Intervention Within the Family Unit
A distinct issue that some legislators continue to grapple with is the
law's place within the family unit.44 "Intimacies of family life" involve
intentional physical and emotional interactions that "would be actionable
between strangers but may be commonplace and expected within the
family." 45 Prior to the creation of domestic violence laws, many law
enforcement agencies would provide few protections to victims, or would
not respond to domestic disturbances because they were considered "civil
matters" that were beyond the scope of perceived authority. 46 However, in
effectuating domestic violence statutes, sufficient authority must be given
to law enforcement agencies in order for such protection to be at all mean-
ingful.47 As a result, statutes may establish guidelines for law enforcement
officers to follow while investigating domestic disputes, and may also set
forth the proper procedures for arresting the perpetrator.4 8
40. DesLauriers, T 14, 642 N.W.2d at 897. However, the use of a dangerous weapon or
instrument, by itself, might not constitute domestic violence. Id. 19, 642 N.W.2d at 898.
41. See Morton County Soc. Serv. Bd. v. Schumacher, 2004 ND 31, 5 19, 674 N.W.2d 505,
509 (upholding the trial court's ruling that smashing a computer with an ax, but without the
intention to harm or frighten the petitioner, was not domestic violence).
42. See id. T 18 (citing various cases where courts found no domestic violence, such as
breaking a flower pot, pulling a phone off the wall, and slashing car tires with a knife).
43. See id. T 8, 674 N.W.2d at 507 (citing Lawrence v. Delkamp, 2000 ND 214, 7, 620
N.W.2d 151, 154) (stating that "a district court's finding on domestic violence is a factual deter-
mination that will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous"; however, "[a] statutory inter-
pretation.. is a matter of law, fully reviewable on appeal").
44. See Grosfeld, supra note 5, at 30-31 (discussing state legislative enhancements designed
to assist victims of domestic violence, but noting that additional refinements are warranted).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. K on subsection 2 (1979).
46. H.R. 46-1621, Reg. Sess., at 5 (N.D. 1979).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (2005) (defining domestic violence); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10 (providing for arrest procedures for domestic violence situations in
North Dakota).
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Currently, most domestic violence statutes have been expanded to cov-
er more people than just wives and husbands.49 By expanding who may be
considered a victim, legislatures appear to be coming to terms with their
ability to exercise police power over the domestic sphere. 50 Additionally, in
creating these statutes, lawmakers have effectively acknowledged that do-
mestic violence may be prevalent in any intimate relationship.5 1 As indi-
cated in national data, "domestic violence cuts across all class, racial,
ethnic, and socioeconomic lines." 52 Consequently, at a minimum, for a
49. See, e.g., id. § 14-07.1-01(4) (extending protection to all family members and intimate
partners). North Dakota extends its domestic violence laws to include "family or household
member[s]," which means:
a spouse, family member, former spouse, parent, child, persons related by blood or
marriage, persons who are in a dating relationship, persons who are presently residing
together or who have resided together in the past, persons who have a child in
common... , and .... any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing
person as determined by the court ....
Id. Oregon also extends its domestic violence laws to "family or household members," meaning
any of the following:
(a) Spouses.
(b) Former spouses.
(c) Adult persons related by blood, marriage or adoption.
(d) Persons who are cohabiting or who have cohabited with each other.
(e) Persons who have been involved in a sexually intimate relationship with each other
within two years immediately preceding the filing by one of them of a petition
order ....
(f) Unmarried parents of a child.
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(3) (2003).
50. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/102(3) (West 2005) (stating that in 1986, the Illinois
legislature finally awoke to the reality that "the legal system has ineffectively dealt with family
violence in the past, allowing abusers to escape effective prosecution or financial liability, and has
not adequately acknowledged the criminal nature of domestic violence"); Domestic Violence
Victim Assistance: Hearing on H.R. 1313 Before the H. Social Services and Veterans' Affairs
Comm., 1981 Leg., 47th Sess., at 2 (N.D. 1981) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1313] (testimony of
Officer Dick Peck, Burleigh County Sheriff Dep't) (testifying that had the Domestic Violence
Victim Assistance Act been passed years ago, the department "could have saved a lot of good
marriages and a lot of people being damaged for life because of the emotions they have to go
through").
51. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 8 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ pub/pdf/ipv.pdf (de-
fining intimate relationships as those involving "current spouses, former spouses, current
boy/girlfriends, or former boy/girlfriends," and providing that "[i]ndividuals involved in an inti-
mate partner relationship may be of the same gender"); TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 4
(reporting that controversy exists regarding whether to limit the definition of intimate partner
violence to marital or heterosexual cohabiting relationships, or to expand it to include couples who
are dating but live in separate domiciles, or same-sex cohabiting or dating relationships).
52. STENEHJEM, supra note 2, at 13.
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crime to be considered domestic violence, the victim must simply know her
or his assailant.53
C. AN ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION IN TORT
In states that do not provide statutory protection against emotional
abuse, victims of such domestic violence may have an alternative cause of
action in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).54
Generally, recovery for mental anguish or emotional distress does not need
to be accompanied by physical injury. 55 Therefore, lIED is a proper cause
of action for victims of nonphysical domestic violence. 56 Courts that have
extended such legal relief in domestic situations effectively recognize that
"[ejmotional distress is as real and tormenting as physical pain, and psycho-
logical well-being deserves as much legal protection as physical well-
being." 57
Where a court finds that the abuse inflicted on a victim satisfies the
rigorous threshold of proof required for IIED, it is appropriate to conclude
that, had the state incorporated emotional abuse in its domestic violence
statute, the victim would necessarily possess an interest in such legal
53. Id. at 1; see also RENNISON & WELCHANS, supra note 51, at 8 (reporting that the
victim's and offender's relationship may fit into any of "four relationship groups: intimate,
friend/acquaintance, other family, and stranger").
54. See Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032, 1039-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that
the pattern of domestic abuse, combined with its duration and the psychological impacts on the
victim, "clearly articulates a pattern of conduct that satisfies the standard necessary to state a
cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress").
55. George L. Blum, Annotation, Intentional Infliction of Distress in Marital Context, 110
A.L.R. 5TH 371, 384 (2003). To recover in an lIED action in jurisdictions not requiring bodily
injury, the victim must show that: (1) the perpetrator's conduct was intentional or in reckless
disregard of the victim; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a causal
connection between the perpetrator's conduct and the victim's mental distress; and (4) the victim's
mental distress was extreme and severe. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
56. See Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d at 1039 (holding that a pattern of domestic abuse over an
eleven-year period may constitute one continuous tort, and that abuse "cannot be trivialized below
the threshold of outrageousness that is actionable, by calculating the annual number of abusive
events and arguing that there were not enough of them per year to matter"). But see Hakkila v.
Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1326 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that in the marital setting, the
"threshold of outrageousness should be set high enough-or the circumstances in which the tort is
recognized should be described precisely enough.., that the social good from recognizing the tort
will not be outweighed by unseemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims").
57. McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Wyo. 2001); see also Christians v. Christians,
2001 SD 142, 1 22, 637 N.W.2d 377, 382 (stating that the court was not "injecting a tort recovery
for [lIED]" into every domestic suit, but rather, that it was "only providing a remedy to an
aggrieved party ... [that is] available to every other citizen of the state"); Henry v. Henry, 2000
SD 4, 5 6, 604 N.W.2d 285, 289 (instructing that "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability" for
the injury which results); Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839, 844 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(instructing that the law intervenes where emotional distress is so severe that "no reasonable
person should be expected to endure it").
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protection. 58 The conduct required to form lIED must be "so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civi-
lized community." 59 Such a situation would be "one in which the recitation
of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous! '60
When an lIED claim encompasses a domestic situation, the abuse is
generally required to be of a habitual nature. 61 Habitually cruel and
inhuman treatment will be established by a continuous course of conduct on
the part of the offending domestic perpetrator, which is "so unkind,
unfeeling or brutal as to endanger, or put one in reasonable apprehension of
danger to life, limb or health .... "62 Finally, the emotional distress the
victim suffers must be extreme and severe.63 Often, the extreme and
outrageous character of the perpetrator's conduct is "in itself important
58. See Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d at 1040 (recognizing that "domestic violence presents
sufficient problems to warrant its own legislative act," and consequently, the "legislature is saying
that such behavior is unacceptable, and from that finding it can be inferred that violent behavior in
the domestic setting is outrageous" as required in an IIED claim); Blum, supra note 55, at 384
(noting that "freedom from mental distress is considered a protected interest" in most courts).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). The South Dakota Supreme
Court in Christians found the husband had committed IIED against his wife by repeatedly
accusing her of child abuse, having their child repeatedly examined by law enforcement,
repeatedly reporting abuse to the Department of Social Services, disclosing financial records to
her clients, causing her to ultimately be fired from her job, and acting on a "prolonged policy of
sabotage, seeking to destroy his wife's future." Christians, 55 24-25, 637 N.W.2d at 382-83, 385.
In Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 260-61 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), a Texas appellate court found that
the perpetrator's acts satisfied the threshold for lIED, including the following: threatening to
smother the victim, threatening to snap her neck, destroying numerous items of her personal
property, destroying college papers, cutting the victim's clothes with scissors, calling her names,
and yelling obscenities at her. An Illinois appellate court in Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d
1032, 1035, 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), found that the perpetrator's acts of verbal abuse, stalking,
and systematically isolating the victim from her family and friends, in addition to physical abuse,
satisfied the threshold for RED. In Holladay v. Holladay, 1999-CA-00291-SCT ( J5 12, 64) (Miss.
2001), 776 So. 2d 662, 666, 677, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the perpetrator's
actions, which included closing the victim's bank account, taking her checkbook, requiring her to
ask for money to buy clothes and personal items, refusing to pay for repairs to her vehicle,
repeatedly calling her vile names, and physically restraining the victim on two separate occasions,
exceeded the threshold for RED. But see Hakkila 812 P.2d at 1324 (warning that an individual
still has the "liberty to express an unflattering opinion of another, however wounding it may be to
his feelings") (citation omitted).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
61. See McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (I11. 1988) (finding the duration of abusive
behavior to be one factor to consider in determining whether that behavior is outrageous in an
lIED claim); Toles, 45 S.W.3d at 262 (observing that when abusive conduct becomes a regular
pattern in a relationship, "it should not be accepted in a civilized society").
62. Holladay, T 64, 776 So. 2d at 677. For conduct to be considered "habitual," it must be
done "often enough or so continuously that it may reasonably be said to be a permanent
condition." Id.
63. Blum, supra note 55, at 385.
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evidence that the distress exist[s]."64 However, no proof is as strong as the
personal testimony of the victim. 65
Ultimately, lIED may be the only action under which a domestic vio-
lence victim can bring a claim. 66 Courts and legislatures should be mindful
that even though abusive events may occur only a few times within a year,
it is this repeated pattern of abuse that inflicts psychological torment.67
Such victims may "live in a constant state of silent fear, generated by the
knowledge that their [family member or domestic partner] ... harbors the
capacity to hurt them." 68 Moreover, the victim begins to realize that the
"abuse is certain to come again" and fears the "intensity of the next
episode." 69
III. DEFINING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NORTH DAKOTA
"There has always been abuse for years back, what we are trying to
do ... is alleviate the suffering." 70  Prior to the enactment of North
Dakota's first domestic violence statute in 1979, the only recognition of
domestic offenses was as a cause for divorce. 71 In 1965, a spouse could be
granted a divorce upon proving "extreme cruelty" or "habitual intem-
perance." 72 However, domestic violence, in and of itself, did not become
an offense for another fourteen years. 73 This section follows the legislative
64. Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839, 844 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
65. See Vance v. Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233, 235 (I11. Ct. App. 1992) (accepting that the
victim was unable to perform her regular duties and activities; became fearful for her life, health,
and safety; "went into hiding"; and remained in fear of being killed); Holladay, 5 32, 64, 776 So.
2d at 670, 677 (finding the victim had become very nervous, anxious, withdrawn, and depressed;
cried often; had an extreme fear of the perpetrator; and could not erase prior violent incidents from
her mind); Behringer, 884 S.W.2d at 844 (finding that the victim was in fear for his life all the
time, slept on the couch in order to have access to both the front and back doors, did not leave his
house at night for over a year, cried in front of other people, and slept with a pistol beside his
bed); see also United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 1992) (producing expert
witness testimony that when a victim is continuously subjected to severe, long-term abuse, she or
he will experience feelings of desperation, isolation, shame, hopelessness, and low self-esteem,
and become submissive and passive).
66. See Grosfeld, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that after the United States Supreme Court
struck down the section of the Violence Against Women Act that granted a federal civil remedy to
domestic violence victims, victims were left only with a state remedy to bring an action in tort).
67. See Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (describing an
abuse situation where the perpetrator of the violence admitted "extreme and outrageous" behavior,
but argued that his former spouse "could have endured" abuse only a few times per year).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Hearing on H.R. 1313, supra note 50, at 6 (testimony of Chairman Haugland).
71. Act of Mar. 6, 1965, ch. 114, sec. 14-05-03, 1965 N.D. Laws 208, 208.
72. Id.; see Act of Mar. 18, 1971, ch. 149, sec. 14-05-03, 14-05-09.1, 1971 N.D. Laws 234
(allowing irreconcilable differences as grounds for divorce in North Dakota).
73. Act of Apr. 7, 1971, ch. 193, sec. 29-01-15, 1979 N.D. Laws 419.
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and judicial development of domestic violence laws in North Dakota, from
their inception in 1979 to the present.7 4
A. THE INCEPTION OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
In North Dakota, the increase and prevalence of domestic violence
prompted new statewide legislation in 1979.75 Prior to this initial domestic
violence law, victims had little, if any, legal protection against domestic
abuse. 76 Defining the offense as "adult abuse," 77 the statute was enacted
due to the recognition that many incidents of abuse were not being reported,
that victims did not know where to seek assistance, and that victims likely
had concerns as to their rights under the law.78 Both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate heard testimony and researched statistical data
provided by police departments, county courts, physicians, psychiatrists,
domestic abuse programs, and clergy members from around the state. 79
Moreover, legislators were informed that such statistics likely revealed only
ten percent of the actual domestic assaults committed, and urged members
to multiply the figures by ten in order to have a "clearer idea of the scope of
the problem in ... the state." 80
1. Modernization of the Adult Abuse Statute
At its inception, "adult abuse" was defined as the "physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault on the complaining adult, or the imminent threat
thereof."81 In addition to defining the offense, the legislation addressed
specific legal alternatives that were not previously available.82 First, it
74. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2005) (providing the current domestic violence
protection order law); 1979 N.D. Laws at 419-22 (developing the first domestic violence law in
North Dakota).
75. H.R. 46-1621, Reg. Sess., at 4 (N.D. 1979).
76. STENEHJEM, supra note 2, at 30. "Early protection orders, when available, were weak,
could not be obtained in emergency situations, and applied only to married women." Id.
77. 1979 N.D. Laws at 419.
78. H.R. 46-1621, Reg. Sess., at 2 (N.D. 1979). Section 5 of the bill addressed a common
fear among abused women that once they left their homes, they gave up all their rights and might
even have faced a charge of desertion. Id. at 5.
79. See Adult Abuse-An Issue of Legislative Concern; Grand Forks Statistics from Agency
Surveys: Testimony on H.R. 1621 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 1979 Leg., 46th Sess. 6-8 (N.D.
1979) [hereinafter Testimony on H.R. 1621] (consolidating domestic violence statistics from
agency surveys and case studies for the years 1976-1978); A Bill Relating to Adult Abuse: Hearing
on H.R. 1621 Before the S. Judiciary, 1979 Leg., 46th Sess. 1-3 (N.D. 1979) (providing testimony
on the physical and emotional impacts of domestic violence); H.R. 46-1621, Reg. Sess., at 7-9
(N.D. 1979) (submitting statistical information from around the state for the year 1978).
80. H.R. 46-1621, Reg. Sess., at 4 (N.D. 1979). FBI estimates revealed that less than one in
ten domestic assaults were reported. Id.
81. 1979 N.D. Laws at419, § 1.
82. Id. §§ 2-9.
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provided that a protection order could be sought by any spouse, family
member, or cohabiting adult "regardless of whether or not a petition for
legal separation, annulment, or divorce ha[s] been filed."83 Second, it au-
thorized judicial intervention to provide protection from domestic violence
perpetrators. 84 Judges were given the authority to act on behalf of a
domestic violence victim, by issuing restraining orders preventing the
abuser from "threatening, molesting, or injuring" the victim; excluding the
abuser from the home or shelter facility; awarding immediate temporary
custody of minor children to the nonabusive party; and requiring that either
or both parties undergo counseling. 85 Finally, the bill provided the victim a
cause of action for the "imminent threat" of a battery or assault against
them.86 That is to say, the victim would no longer have to actually
experience physical assault or injury.87
2. The North Dakota Supreme Court's Interpretation of the New
Statute
When construing a statute, the court must ascertain the legislature's
intent. 88 Words are to be given their "plain, ordinary and commonly
understood meaning, with consideration of 'the ordinary sense of statutory
words, the context in which they were enacted, and the purpose which
prompted the enactment.'"89 The general intent of the North Dakota legis-
lature in defining domestic abuse was to provide legal protection to the
women and men who were, and would be, victims of "this particular
83. Id. § 2(1).
84. See id. (providing that an action for a protection order may be brought in the district
court).
85. Id. § 2.
86. Id. § 1.
87. See id. (emphasis added) (broadening the protection afforded to domestic violence
victims in North Dakota). The House Judiciary Committee concluded its recommendation of
House Bill 1621 with the following statements:
Assault is a serious crime. To be confronted by the fear of continued assault because a
person is in a "domestic situation" is tragic. Victims of adult abuse must be offered a
legal recourse when faced with bodily harm. Availability of this legal order for
protection will offer an avenue of just judicial intervention to hundreds of victims of
abuse in North Dakota.
Testimony on H.R. 1621, supra note 79, at 4.
88. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 160 (N.D. 1995).
89. Id. at 160 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-05 (2003)). The North Dakota Supreme
Court perceived the adult abuse statute to be "an innovative, unique effort to provide an
alternative remedy in domestic violence matters." Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 233 (N.D.
1980).
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
criminal assault." 90 However, the plain language of the statute did not
make clear which specific types of assault were to be afforded protection.91
The sole interpretation of North Dakota's first domestic violence law
was an expansive one. 92 In Lucke v. Lucke,93 the North Dakota Supreme
Court construed the adult abuse law "liberally, with a view to effecting its
objects and to promoting justice."94 The petitioner instituted an action
under the statute, claiming that she and other members of her family were
being abused by her father.95 Pertinent findings of fact provided that: (1)
the defendant had been having sexual intercourse with three of his
daughters for a period of ten years; (2) the defendant had attempted to
establish incestuous relations with the petitioner, his daughter; and (3) the
defendant had committed adult abuse upon the petitioner and other
members of the family.96 The defendant argued that the only adult abuse
that could be involved in a proceeding under the statute was physical
abuse.97 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that, as
a matter of law, "adult abuse is not limited to physical harm, bodily injury
and assault or the imminent threat thereof, but includes all forms of abuse,
including mental harm."98 Through its interpretation, the court expanded
statutory protection against domestic violence to include sexual assault and
mental harm.99 However, the legislature would soon depart from the
court's interpretation as it redefined domestic abuse in North Dakota. 100
90. H.R. 46-1621, Reg. Sess., at 3 (N.D. 1979).
91. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d at 233-34. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that when the
adult abuse statute was enacted, minimal legislative history was left regarding the legislature's
intent. Id.
92. Id. at 234.
93. 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980).
94. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d at 234 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (2003)). The court
focused on the word "includes" and interpreted it to be a word of enlargement, not a word of
limitation, meaning that "'includes' should be read as if the phrase 'but is not limited to' were set
forth." Id. This construction caused the statute to read: "'adult abuse' includes [, but is not
limited to,] physical harm, bodily injury, or assault on the complaining adult, or the imminent
threat thereof." Act of Apr. 7, 1979, ch. 193, sec. 29-01-15, §1, 1979 N.D. Laws 419.
95. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d at 232.
96. Id. at 232-33.
97. Id. at 233.
98. Id. at 234. The court alluded to the fact that in order to "make all provisions of the adult
abuse law fully operative," the legislature would need to correct the language of the bill. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Act of Mar. 31, 1981, ch. 168, sec. 14-03-21, 14-03-22, 1981 N.D. Laws 396, 396-
98 (amending the definition of "domestic violence").
[VOL. 81:837
2005] NOTE
3. Amendments Excluding Emotional Abuse
In 1981, during the following legislative session, the legislature re-
visited the issue of domestic violence in North Dakota.101 "When the
legislature amends an existing statute, it indicates its intent to change the
statute's meaning in accord with its new terms."1 02 The offense was
amended to read: "'Domestic violence' means any act or threatened act
which results or threatens to result in bodily injury, and which is committed
by a person against another person to whom such person is married or has
been married, or with whom such person is residing or has resided
lawfully."103 By providing protection only for actual or threatened physical
harm, the legislature acutely proclaimed its divergence from the North
Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of the prior statute. 104 Because the
statute was amended after the court construed the predecessor statute in
Lucke, it may be presumed that the legislature was responding to that
construction.10 5 If the legislature had intended mental harm to be a pro-
tected form of abuse, it would not have defined "domestic violence" using
solely the limiting phrase of "bodily injury."106
101. See id. §§ 3-4 (providing for state funding of domestic violence victim assistance
organizations); Act of Mar. 19, 1981, ch. 167, sec. 14-07.1-02, 14-07.1-03, 1981 N.D. Laws 393,
393-95 (amending the North Dakota Century Code relating to adult abuse protection orders).
Specifically, the legislature allotted grant monies to nonprofit organizations designed to assist
victims of domestic violence and their dependents. 1981 N.D. Laws at 396, § 1. Additionally, it
amended the requirements for securing an adult abuse protection order. 1981 N.D. Laws at 393,
§ 1. Most importantly, a provision allowing temporary protection orders to be granted upon "an
allegation of a recent incident of actual abuse or threat of abuse" was added. Id. § 2(1) (emphasis
added). This amendment seems to have been included due to the lingering concern that some sort
of protection should be available for nonphysical abuse. A Bill Relating to Protection Orders and
Abuse: Hearing on S. 2339 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 1981 Leg., 47th Sess. 1 (N.D. 1981)
(statement of Sen. Wayne Stenehjem, bill sponsor, North Dakota Senate). While the original
statute gave some authority in cases of immediate and present danger of abuse, a predilection for
protection in cases of abuse where there is "a threat and not actual laying on of hands on [the]
victim" existed amongst legislators. A Bill Relating to Protection Orders and Abuse: Hearing on
S. 2339 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1981 Leg., 47th Sess. 1 (N.D. 1981) (statement of Pat
Seaworth, attorney, Legal Assistance for North Dakota).
102. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D. 1995).
103. 1981 N.D. Laws at 396, § 2(2) (emphasis added).
104. See 1981 N.D. Laws at 393-95 (providing for adult abuse protection orders only upon a
showing of actual or imminent adult abuse).
105. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 161. The court further noted that:
The legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of terms in the original act,
and an amendment substituting a new term or phrase for one previously construed
indicates that the judicial ... construction of the former term or phrase did not
correspond with the legislative intent and a different interpretation should be given the
new term or phrase.
Id.
106. Cf id. at 163 (acknowledging the use of limiting or expanding phrases).
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By excluding emotional abuse from the definition of "domestic
violence," the legislature set the tone for future amendments.107 In 1989,
the statute was amended to enumerate the possible abuses as "physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical
harm .... "08 Later, in 1995, the statute was again amended to include
"sexual activity compelled by physical force . . "109 No changes have
been made to the definition of "domestic violence" since the 1995
amendment. 110 Aside from proving the existence of threatened imminent
bodily harm, victims of nonphysical domestic abuse have not been able to
invoke statutory protection.111
B. CURRENT STATUS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NORTH DAKOTA
LAW
In North Dakota, a claim involving domestic abuse is considered "a
civil action in which a party must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence" that an allegedly violent family or household member inflicted
domestic violence upon another family or household member.1 12 While the
statute provides a broad definition of who the perpetrator and the victim
may be, the specific actions that the statute safeguards against are
limited.113 Currently, "domestic violence" is defined as: "physical harm,
bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the
infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity
compelled by physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on
the complaining family or household members."1 14
107. See Act of Mar. 15, 1995, ch. 150, sec. 14.07.1-01, §2, 1995 N.D. Laws 482, 482
(adding sexual assault as an action constituting domestic violence); Act of Apr. 11, 1989, ch. 177,
sec. 14-07.1-01, §2, 1989 N.D. Laws 536, 536-37 (enumerating the types of physical harm that
constitute domestic violence).
108. 1989 N.D. Laws at 536-37.
109. 1995 N.D. Laws at 482.
110. See Act of Apr. 12, 2005, ch. 133, sec. 14-07.1-01, §2, 2005 N.D. Laws 692, 692
(reenacting North Dakota Century Code section 14-07.1-01(2) with the exact wording for the
definition of "domestic violence" as was enacted in 1995).
111. See Lovcik v. Ellingson, 1997 ND 201, T 11,569 N.W.2d 697, 699 (stating that a trial
court may only provide injunctive relief from domestic violence through a protection order upon
"a showing of actual or imminent domestic violence" per section 14-07.1-02(4)); see also
STENEHJEM, supra note 2, at 8 (recognizing that state law enforcement statistics only reflect
domestic violence of a physical nature, compared to state advocacy organizations that recognize
both physical and nonphysical domestic violence).
112. Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2004 ND 153, 5 11, 684 N.W.2d 619, 626.
113. See Dinius v. Dinius, 1997 ND 115, 16, 564 N.W.2d 300, 303 (stating that section 14-
07.1-01(2) of the North Dakota Century Code is very broad in defining who a victim may be).
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (2005).
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Under the statute, nonphysical abuse can only constitute domestic
violence if it inflicts the fear of imminent physical harm upon the victim. 11 5
To satisfy this standard, the petitioner must prove that the abuse did, in fact,
have such an effect."16 A significant aspect of the imminence of a threat is
the uncertainty of what the perpetrator will do." 7 Consequently, in proving
that such fear of imminent bodily harm existed, a victim may use testimony
about the specific circumstances that instilled the fear, the perpetrator's
character, past abusive disputes, or any attempted injury. 18 "Although past
abusive behavior is not dispositive, it is relevant in determining whether
domestic violence is actual or imminent."119 Since the court "need not
await a more tragic event to take action" where a history of allegations of
abuse exists, the court may consider events that happened previously as
"relevant evidence of what might occur in the future."120 Upon weighing
all the circumstances of a situation, the court will determine whether the
threats of bodily harm were severe and imminent enough to satisfy the
statutory requirements. 121
IV. CONCLUSION
In North Dakota, judges are able to sufficiently protect victims of
emotional abuse even in the absence of inclusive statutory language.122
115. Lawrence v. Delkamp, 2000 ND 214, 1 6, 620 N.W.2d 151, 154. "Imminent" may be
construed as meaning "immediate" or "soon to be inflicted." Id. 1 10, 620 N.W.2d at 155. If the
perpetrator is speaking of an action anticipated to occur in the future, or if the perpetrator is
leaving the scene, or does not have the current ability to fulfill the threats, no aspect of immediacy
may be inferred. Id. II.
116. Id.T 10.
117. Interview with Judge Joel Medd, supra note 21.
118. Lovcik v. Ellingson, 1997 ND 201, 55 12-13, 569 N.W.2d 697, 699.
119. Id. 5 16, 569 N.W.2d at 700.
120. Id.
121. See id. 15 13-14, 569 N.W.2d at 699 (upholding the trial court's finding of fact that
based on the totality of the circumstances domestic violence existed).
122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2005) (providing statutory protection for domestic
violence victims in North Dakota through domestic violence protection orders). Each judge
interviewed for this article consciously recognizes emotional abuse in the domestic violence
context; however, each goes about such recognition in a slightly different way. See Interview with
Judge Sonja Clapp, supra note 21 (noting the number of nonphysically abused petitioners who
claim property damage or stalking); Interview with Judge Debbie Kleven, supra note 18
(discussing the lack of control and imposed isolation that many nonphysically abused petitioners
experience); Interview with Judge Joel Medd, supra note 21 (recognizing the abusive language
and verbal threats made toward nonphysically abused domestic violence victims). Judge Sonja
Clapp utilizes disorderly conduct restraining orders, under North Dakota Century Code section
12.1-31.2-01, as an "umbrella to put emotional abuse under." Interview with Judge Sonja Clapp,
supra note 21. Judge Debbie Kleven employs her subjective discretion, and at times considers the
holding in Lucke when determining the presence of severe emotional abuse. Interview with Judge
Debbie Kleven, supra note 18. However, Judge Kleven does not grant protection orders freely
when no physical abuse exists, but rather establishes a threshold of proof requiring a petitioner to
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Courts may grant protection through satisfaction of the imminent fear
clause; the invocation of separate statutes, such as stalking or harassment
laws; the issuance of a disorderly conduct protection order; or by working
around the system and citing the North Dakota Supreme Court in Lucke.1 23
Regardless, some local judges have concluded that it would be beneficial
for the North Dakota legislature to further develop the offense of domestic
violence by providing statutory protection against emotional abuse in the
definition.124 Such an amendment could read: "Domestic violence" in-
cludes physical harm; bodily injury; assault; sexual activity compelled by
physical force or assault; the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm,
assault, or sexual activity compelled by physical force or assault; severe
emotional abuse adversely effecting feelings of safety or security; stalking;
or harassment, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or
household members.125 This definition concisely combines current North
Dakota statutes and adds emotional abuse as a recognizable element of
domestic violence. 126
Regardless of the offense's definition, it is crucial for judges and law-
makers to acknowledge the reasons emotional abuse occurs and the impact
it has on a domestic violence victim.127 As the North Dakota Supreme
be honestly fearful. Id. Judge Joel Medd combines his subjective discretion with a compre-
hensive interpretation of the statute by looking at the infliction of fear of violence within a
situation. Interview with Judge Joel Medd, supra note 21.
123. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (2005) (establishing "stalking" as a crime
punishable in the North Dakota Criminal Code); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (2005)
(providing statutory protection to domestic violence victims who can prove they experienced a
fear of imminent physical harm with statutory protection); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02
(establishing the issuance requirements and restrictions placed on a perpetrator through a domestic
violence protection order); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (2005) (establishing the
requirements and penalties governing disorderly conduct restraining orders); Lucke v. Lucke, 300
N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980) (acknowledging the offense of mental harm).
124. See Interview with Judge Debbie Kleven, supra note 18 (stating that simply listing
emotional abuse in the definition would be helpful, and that no further definition would likely be
necessary because judges see emotional abuse enough to know when it exists and when a
petitioner's claims are false or exaggerated); Interview with Judge Joel Medd, supra note 21
(articulating that inclusion of emotional abuse in the statute would be useful because all rights
available to the victim would be succinctly stated in one place within the code). But see Interview
with Judge Sonja Clapp, supra note 21 (asserting a preference for the narrow definition because it
provides a bright-line standard of law, and thus limits the necessary witness testimony and reduces
the subjective discretion required of the finder of fact).
125. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (providing the foundation language for the
proposed amendment). To create ease for the reader of this statute, the section numbers of the
stalking and harassment laws may be included. Consequently, that part of the statute would read:
". stalking, as defined in section 12.1-17-07.1; or harassment, as defined in section 12.1-17-
0 7 ...."
126. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (2005) (establishing stalking laws in North
Dakota); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (2005) (establishing harassment laws in North Dakota).
127. See Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2005) (statement of Diane M. Stuart, Director, Office on
NOTE
Court has stated, "Domestic violence is not caused by stress in the
perpetrator's life, alcohol consumption, or a particular victim's propensity
to push a perpetrator's buttons. Rather, domestic violence is a learned
pattern of behavior aimed at gaining a victim's compliance."128 For the
perpetrator to get what he or she wants, domestic abuse may take on many
forms.129 Ultimately, the level of abuse is immaterial and should not be
measured simply by physical injury, but rather by the intimidation and fear
invoked in the victim. 130
Joy M. Bingham*
Violence Against Women, U.S. Dep't of Justice), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ovw/docs/
testimony/07192005.pdf (presenting findings that "a coordinated community response is the only
way to eradicate the brutal crimes of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and
stalking").
128. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 164 (N.D. 1995) (citations omitted).
129. Hearing on H.R. 1313, supra note 50, at 5 (statement of Donald Becker, Director,
Community Action Center).
130. Id.
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